Date: 02-03-2010

Case Style: Lespia King v. George M. McMillan

Case Number: 08-1667, 08-1713, 08-1974

Judge: Michael

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on appeal from the Western District of Virginia

Plaintiff's Attorney: John Adrian Gibney, Jr., THOMPSON MCMULLAN,
PC, Richmond, Virginia; Elizabeth Kay Dillon, GUYNN, MEMMER & DILLON, PC, Salem, Virginia, for
Appellants.

Defendant's Attorney: Terry Neill Grimes, GRIMES & WILLIAMS,
PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Description: Lespia King, a former deputy in the sheriff’s office for the
City of Roanoke, Virginia, sued Sheriff George McMillan in
his official capacity under Title VII for sexual harassment and
in his individual capacity under Virginia law for battery.
While King’s suit was pending, Octavia Johnson replaced
McMillan as sheriff, and the district court substituted Johnson
as the defendant in her official capacity in King’s Title VII
claim. The jury found for King on both claims. On appeal
Sheriff Johnson argues that because each sheriff in Virginia
is by state law a singular entity with an independent tenure,
she could not be substituted in her official capacity as the successor
to McMillan in the Title VII claim. Because acceptance
of this argument would allow state law to override Title VII
in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we conclude that Johnson’s
substitution was proper. Both Johnson and McMillan
challenge the district court’s rulings on the admission of certain
evidence and the court’s denial of their motions regarding
liability and damages allowable. For the reasons explained
below, we also reject these challenges. Accordingly, the judgments
against both Johnson and McMillan are affirmed.

I.

A.

In August 2005 Lespia King, who had served as a deputy
in the Roanoke sheriff’s office, sued Sheriff George McMillan in the Western District of Virginia. King sued McMillan
in his official capacity for sexual harassment in her employment
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and in his individual
capacity for battery under Virginia state law. While the suit
was pending, Sheriff McMillan lost a reelection bid to Sheriff
Octavia Johnson. Thereafter, the district court, invoking Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), substituted Johnson in her
official capacity as the defendant in King’s Title VII claim.

Because King prevailed at trial, we recite the facts in the light
most favorable to her. ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 113 (4th Cir. 2006).

B.

In the summer of 2000, when she was twenty-two years
old, King started her first full-time job as a jail deputy, working
for Sheriff McMillan. Although Sheriff McMillan told his
employees that he did not tolerate sexual harassment, he qualified
this avowal by informing them that he was a "touchyfeely
person" and that he liked touching people when he
talked with them. J.A. 141. This self-characterization was an
understatement when it came to McMillan’s interactions with
King during the four years she worked as one of McMillan’s
deputies.

Every six or eight weeks, on average, King had an encounter
with McMillan during which McMillan made her uncomfortable
by touching her in sexually aggressive ways and by
making inappropriate (or suggestive) comments. The offensive
remarks began during King’s job interview with McMillan,
when he told her that she was an attractive woman who
would be "hit[ ] on" by male police officers. J.A. 266. Thereafter,
when King encountered McMillan at work, he insisted
on hugging her. King responded by "tens[ing] up" and trying
to hug McMillan from the side to avoid frontal contact, but
McMillan would grab her for a more invasive hug, slide his
arms down her back, and place them around her buttocks. J.A.
263. McMillan also told King that he liked her hair long.

About a month after King started her job, McMillan was at
the shooting range and happened to notice that King was having
difficulty putting on her new leather gun belt. Unsolicited,
McMillan stepped in to assist, touching King repeatedly in the
waist area as he inserted the fasteners around her inner belt.

This incident embarrassed King and made her "very uncomfortable."
J.A. 267. McMillan’s recurring harassment caused
King to dread having contact with him; when she could, she
would hide to avoid him.

King was especially intimidated by McMillan for two reasons.
First, he controlled her job and working conditions, and
there was no one superior to him in the chain of command.

Second, he was "physically overwhelming" — six feet four
inches tall, weighing 270 pounds. J.A. 323. King, on the other
hand, was five feet four inches tall and weighed about 120
pounds when she began working for McMillan.

In 2003 King met privately with McMillan to request a
shift transfer. Several times during the meeting McMillan patted
King’s knee or touched her leg. He also asked her to sit
on his lap and told her that she would have to choose him
over her boyfriend (also a sheriff’s office employee) if she
wanted a transfer or promotion. Worried that McMillan would
not approve the shift transfer otherwise, King sat on McMillan’s
lap and gave him a hug. McMillan then asked for a kiss.

To get out of the situation, King tried to give McMillan a "dry
peck" on the cheek, but he turned his head so that the kiss
landed on his lips. J.A. 272.

Sometime later, at a regional jail association dinner,
McMillan seized the opportunity to take further liberties with
King. McMillan greeted King by hugging her, sliding his
hands downward, and placing them around her buttocks.
McMillan then told King that he would hold her until her boy-
friend noticed and became jealous. As word of the incident
spread, several of King’s coworkers commented to her that
she had been "struck by the gropealope," a phrase used by
some to describe McMillan and his harassment. J.A. 275.

King was "very embarrass[ed]" because "[i]t seemed like
everybody knew that [she] had been pawed at [and] grabbed
in public at a dinner." J.A. 276. After these incidents King
suffered health problems, including weight gain, temporomandibular
joint disorder (TMJ), sleeplessness, and nightmares
about McMillan.

By early 2004 King had concluded that working under
McMillan was intolerable, and she applied for another job.

McMillan learned of this development, and on March 10,
2004, he called King into a conference room and shut the
door. He urged her not to quit. He told her that she "could
have a great career" in his office and gain an immediate promotion
to the "position that [she] wanted" (working in the
courtroom), if she would just choose him over her boyfriend.

J.A. 278. McMillan also told King that she was very attractive,
that he liked her longer hair style, that her "legs looked
really, really good" in the skirt she had worn to the jail association
dinner, and that she would be dating him if he were
younger. J.A. 279. At the end of the meeting McMillan asked
King for a hug, grabbed her around her waist, and pulled her
down to sit on his lap. McMillan told King that he would not
let her go until she gave him a kiss. King tried to give him a
peck on the cheek, but McMillan insisted upon a "real kiss."
J.A. 280. After McMillan forced a full kiss on King’s lips, she
ran out of the room into a restroom, where she cried for about
ten minutes. King submitted a letter of resignation several
days later.

The district court admitted testimony, over objection from
McMillan and Johnson, from other women who worked for
McMillan, either as employees or providers of contractual
services, and who were sexually harassed by him. The women
testified that McMillan made inappropriate sexual remarks to
them, asked them for kisses and hugs, and touched them in
ways that made them feel uncomfortable.

C.

The jury returned liability verdicts for King on both the
Title VII and battery claims. The jury awarded King $50,000
in compensatory damages on the Title VII claim, $175,000 in
compensatory damages on the battery claim, and $100,000 in
punitive damages on the battery claim. The court remitted the
compensatory damages on the battery claim to $50,000, and
the judgment order provided that there could be only one
recovery for compensatory damages, not to exceed $50,000.

Johnson and McMillan both appeal. Johnson argues that the
district court improperly substituted her under Rule 25(d) as
a defendant, in her official capacity, in King’s Title VII claim.

Both Johnson and McMillan challenge the district court’s
admission of the testimony from other women, who described
McMillan’s harassment of them. McMillan challenges the
court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law
on the battery claim, its allowance of punitive damages on
that claim, and its denial of his motion for a new trial. Johnson
also claims that the district court’s evidentiary rulings
entitle her to a new trial.

II.

A.

Sheriff Johnson contends that the district court erred in substituting
her, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), as
the defendant in place of McMillan in King’s Title VII claim,
which was filed against McMillan in his official capacity.

Johnson argues that she, in her official capacity, cannot be
substituted as McMillan’s successor because under Virginia
law "her service as Sheriff beg[an] an entire new office, unrelated
to McMillan’s regime." Appellant’s Br. at 13. We reject
Johnson’s argument because the Supremacy Clause does not
permit the use of state law to cut off — through denial of Rule
25(d) substitution — a Title VII (official capacity) claim
brought against a state official who leaves office while the
claim is pending.

The Constitution of Virginia requires "the qualified voters
of each county and city" to elect a sheriff. Va. Const. art. VII,
§ 4; see also Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1600 (repeating the constitutional
requirement). Sheriffs appoint their own deputies,
Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1603, and a deputy’s term extends for
the term of the appointing sheriff, see id. (providing that deputy
may perform duties "during [appointing sheriff’s] continuance
in office"); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 663
(W.D. Va. 1977), rev’d in part on other grounds, 589 F.2d
753 (4th Cir. 1978). These provisions, Johnson maintains,
confirm that Virginia law does not create an institutional
"sheriff’s office." Rather, she claims that each sheriff is a
"singular entity," circumscribed by his or her term of office,
who is "legally independent" of predecessors and successors.

Appellant’s Br. at 14. Because Virginia law creates each sheriff
as a separate and independent entity, Johnson claims that
she cannot be substituted under Rule 25(d) in her official
capacity in King’s Title VII claim to be liable for McMillan’s
conduct during his term.

If we accepted Johnson’s argument, it would permit states
to draft laws defining state and local offices in such a way as
to limit the liability of their occupants under federal law.

Regardless of whether Johnson reads Virginia law correctly
with respect to the circumscribed authority of an individual
sheriff, Virginia law cannot override Title VII employer liability.

The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus,
"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution,"
the "relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for
any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged
power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,
must yield." Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). The 1972 amendments
to Title VII expanded the statute "to bring the States [and their
political subdivisions] within its purview," and the Supreme
Court has held that these amendments are an express abrogation
of state sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 448-49 & n.2, 457 (1976). In sum, state law demarcations
of particular offices cannot be used to cut off the (federal)
Title VII rights of state and local employees.

The district court properly concluded that Virginia law
could not bar Sheriff Johnson’s substitution, in her official
capacity, as the defendant in King’s Title VII claim when
Johnson succeeded McMillan as sheriff. Rule 25(d) provides
that an "action does not abate when a public officer who is a
party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases
to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s successor
is automatically substituted as a party." The advisory
committee notes confirm that the rule is "merely a procedural
device for substituting a successor for a past officeholder."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) advisory committee’s note (1961
amendment). The rule "does not affect any substantive issues
which may be involved in the action." Id.

Sheriff Johnson argues that because she is a singular and
independent entity under Virginia law, she cannot be a successor
under Rule 25(d). Johnson misunderstands what it
means to be a successor under the rule. It simply means that
she followed Sheriff McMillan as sheriff of the City of Roanoke
and that King’s Title VII claim against Sheriff McMillan
in his official capacity did not abate when he left office.

Rather, the official capacity claim continues in the name of
Sheriff Johnson, who is not personally liable for Title VII violations
committed during Sheriff McMillan’s term. Rule 25(d)
thus protects the public employee who may need more than
the original Title VII defendant’s term of office to litigate her
official capacity claim.

Our court has not allowed the argument that each Virginia
sheriff is a legally separate entity to interfere with the determination
of an appropriate remedy under Title VII. In United
States v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1246 (4th Cir. 1989), we
rejected a Virginia sheriff’s assertion that his separate and
independent status under state law precluded an award of
injunctive relief against him under Title VII for the discriminatory
practices of a prior sheriff. As we noted, "[u]nder federal
law, Title VII remedies have not been limited to
correcting only ongoing discriminatory policies." Id. "District
courts clearly have the authority and should exercise the
power to grant injunctive relief even after apparent discontinuance
of unlawful practices." Id. (emphasis added). Although
Gregory addressed injunctive relief, its reasoning applies to
monetary relief: this relief should not be denied because the
discriminatory acts were committed by a prior sheriff. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b), 2000e-5(g)(1) (providing for both injunctive
and monetary relief).

We affirm the district court’s decision to substitute, pursuant
to Rule 25(d), Sheriff Johnson in her official capacity as
defendant in place of Sheriff McMillan with respect to King’s
Title VII claim.

B.

McMillan and Johnson argue that the district court erred in
admitting the testimony of other women who said they were
sexually harassed by McMillan while they worked for him in
the sheriff’s office. We review a district court’s rulings on the
admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006). The district
court ruled that the testimony of other victims was admissible
because it was relevant to King’s Title VII claim and because
its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice.

Testimony from other employees describing their own
experiences of harassment by the defendant is often relevant
to a plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. Fox v. GMC,
247 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (pointing to testimony of
other employees regarding supervisors’ treatment in concluding
that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of hostile work
environment under the Americans with Disabilities Act).

Here, the district court properly determined that the testimony
of the other women was relevant to two elements of
King’s hostile work environment claim: (1) whether McMillan’s
unwelcome conduct was because of King’s sex, and (2)
whether the unwelcome conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile work environment. See Ziskie v.
Minetta, 547 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2008) (detailing elements
of hostile work environment claim). Further, the court
took the precaution of instructing the jury that the testimony
of others was relevant to the "severe or pervasive" element
only if King "was aware of [the harassment described in the
testimony] during the course of her employment." J.A. 490S.

As for testimony about incidents of harassment that King was
not aware of, the court correctly instructed the jury that this
testimony was relevant to the element of whether McMillan’s
unwelcome conduct toward King was because of her sex. See,
e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff’s knowledge of harassment
or pervasively sexist attitudes is not . . . a requirement
for admitting testimony on those subjects" because testimony
is probative of discriminatory intent). In an effort to prevent
the introduction of testimony about McMillan’s harassment
that King was unaware of, Johnson’s counsel offered to stipulate
that if there was sexual harassment, it was because of
King’s sex. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting the stipulation on the ground that the testimony was
relevant to prove an element of the Title VII claim, even
though the existence of the element (because of sex) was
fairly obvious. Further, the court conducted a Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 analysis and concluded that the probative value
of the testimony concerning conduct that King was unaware
of was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The court further concluded that it could avoid
unfair prejudice by only admitting testimony of harassment
that occurred during "the same timeframe" of King’s employment.
J.A. 158. "Rule 403 judgments are preeminently the
province of the trial courts," United States v. Love, 134 F.3d
595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998), and the district court’s careful analysis
in this case merits our deference.

McMillan argues that the district court erred by not
expressly instructing the jury that the testimony of female
employees was relevant only to the Title VII claim and that
it could not be considered in the state-law battery claim
against McMillan. The prejudice caused by the court’s failure
to give this specific instruction, McMillan contends, is evidenced
by the fact that the jury awarded King significantly
more damages on the battery claim ($175,000 compensatory
and $100,000 punitive) than the damages on the Title VII
claim ($50,000 compensatory). McMillan maintains that the
punitive aspect that the district court believed was included in
the compensatory damages for battery stemmed from the jury
hearing the testimony of other female employees.

We review the district court’s decisions on jury instructions
for abuse of discretion. Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340
F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003). "Instructions will be considered
adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole
record, [they] adequately [informed] the jury of the controlling
legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury
to the prejudice of the existing party." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). "If we find the instructions flawed, we will not
reverse unless the error seriously prejudiced the challenging
party’s case." Id.

The instructions regarding the testimony of the other
female employees were adequately keyed to the elements of
King’s Title VII hostile work environment claim. The district
court’s refusal to give McMillan’s instruction with respect to
limiting this testimony to the Title VII claim did not amount
to an abuse of discretion. Taken as a whole, the instructions
correctly explained the law and did not comingle King’s two
claims. The interrogatories provided to the jury separated
King’s two claims into (1) whether "sexual harassment in her
work place was so pervasive or severe as to alter the terms of
her employment and create a hostile work environment" and
(2) whether "McMillan battered King." J.A. 490D. The
instructions regarding the testimony of other female employees
referred to these employees’ "alleged incidents of sexual
harassment by George McMillan." J.A. 490S. The instructions
then said that the evidence was received as evidence of
whether McMillan’s harassment of King was based on her sex
and whether it was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Id. The
clear implication of the instructions was that the testimony of
the other women was relevant only to King’s Title VII claim.

Further, the court reduced the risk of confusion by instructing
the jury that the testimony was not character evidence.

Finally, even if we assume that there was some prejudice to
McMillan on the battery claim as a result of the testimony of
the other women and the instructions, the court took sufficient
curative measures by remitting the compensatory damages for
battery to $50,000 — a $125,000 reduction.

C.

McMillan argues that the district court erred in denying his
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 50 motion for judgment
as a matter of law on King’s battery claim because the evidence
established that King consented to McMillan’s touching
at the March 10, 2004, meeting. We review de novo a
district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion. ABT Bldg. Prods.
Corp., 472 F.3d at 113. "[T]he issue for assessment on appeal
is whether there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, to find for that party." Id. "If
reasonable minds could differ about the verdict, we are
obliged to affirm." Id.

"The tort of battery is an unwanted touching which is neither
consented to, excused, nor justified." Koffman v. Garnett,
574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va. 2003). The question of whether a
touching was consented to is for the jury. Here, a reasonable
jury could easily decide that King’s compliance with Sheriff
McMillan’s request for a kiss in March 2004 was motivated
by fear and did not amount to consent. The facts, viewed in
the light most favorable to King, establish that she was alone
and behind closed doors with a man who controlled her job
and who was physically overpowering. McMillan forced the
one-on-one meeting with King to persuade her — against her
will — to remain in his employment, a circumstance that
amplified her anxiety and fear. Part of her fear of McMillan
stemmed from his ultimate authority, including his ability,
through unfavorable recommendations, to make it difficult for
her to work in her chosen field (law enforcement). McMillan’s
request for a kiss came after he commented on King’s
physical attractiveness, after he suggested that the two of
them would be dating were it not for King’s boyfriend, and
most important, after he grabbed her around the waist and
pulled her down onto his lap. McMillan kept his arms around
King’s waist and said he would not let her go until she kissed
him. King tried to mitigate the offensiveness of this inescapable,
uninvited contact by giving McMillan a "peck on the
cheek." J.A. 280. Unsatisfied, McMillan demanded a "real
kiss." Id. King reluctantly complied by pursing her lips, but
McMillan, ever-determined, turned the kiss into an invasive
one. Thereafter, King fled the room and cried for about ten
minutes. There was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury
to conclude that King did not consent to the physical maltreatment
she suffered at the hands of McMillan on March 10,
2004. McMillan’s Rule 50(b) motion was properly denied.

D.

McMillan argues that the district court committed further
error in handling the state-law battery claim against him,
asserting that the court (1) should not have given a punitive
damages instruction, (2) should have further remitted King’s
compensatory damages, and (3) should have remitted the
punitive damages award.

When there is no constitutional challenge to a jury’s award
of punitive damages, a "federal district court reviews such an
award by applying the state’s substantive law of punitive
damages under standards imposed by federal procedural law."
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, 99 F.3d
587, 593 (4th Cir. 1996). "Thus, the district court is to determine
whether the jury’s verdict is within the confines set by
state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards
developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur
should be ordered." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

We review the district court’s determination under these
standards for an abuse of discretion. Defender Indus. v. Nw.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 506 (4th Cir. 1991).
Virginia law authorizes punitive damages not only for malicious
conduct but also for "negligence which is so willful or
wanton as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others."
Etherton v. Doe, 597 S.E.2d 87, 90 (Va. 2004). "[A]
jury’s award of damages may not be set aside by a trial court
. . . unless the damages are so excessive" as to "create the
impression that the jury has been influenced by passion or
prejudice or has in some way misconceived or misunderstood
the facts or the law." Downer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 507 S.E.2d
612, 614 (Va. 1998).

The March 10, 2004, incident amounted to malicious conduct
on McMillan’s part toward King or at least evinced
McMillan’s conscious disregard of King’s rights. The incident
was the immediate by-product of King’s wrenching decision
to seek another job in order to free herself from McMillan’s
oppressive harassment. McMillan forced King to submit to
his harassing comments and physical contact. McMillan inappropriately
commented on King’s long hair, legs, and overall
attractiveness. When King acknowledged that she was "seriously
considering" quitting her job with McMillan, he said
that she could have a "great career" in his office, and a better
position immediately, if she would only "choose him" over
her boyfriend. J.A. 279. He pulled her down and held her
around the waist until she agreed to kiss him. This conduct
evinced nothing short of a conscious disregard of King’s
rights to be free from harassment and to make uncoerced
career choices. McMillan’s battery of King warranted the
imposition of punitive damages.

McMillan contends that, even if punitive damages were
justified, the $100,000 amount was excessive because it
reflected the jury’s passion and prejudice upon hearing the
testimony of other female employees — testimony that did
not pertain to the March 2004 incident that formed the basis
of the battery claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in upholding the punitive damages award. The court
properly instructed the jury that its punitive damages award,
if any, should be fixed "using calm discretion and sound reason,"
uninfluenced by "sympathy or dislike." J.A. 490C.
McMillan’s conduct during the March 2004 meeting was
beyond egregious. The district court properly concluded that
the jury, in compliance with the court’s instructions, based its
punitive award on McMillan’s treatment of King during the
relevant incident, not McMillan’s behavior towards other
female employees.

We also reject McMillan’s contention that the amount of
damages (as remitted) on the battery claim was excessive. A
trial court’s evaluation of an award of compensatory damages
is less searching than its evaluation of an award of punitive
damages. A "trial judge’s determination that a jury’s award of
compensatory damages is not excessive will not be set aside
unless the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence,
or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a
miscarriage of justice." Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974
F.2d 1408, 1414 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).

For punitive damages, however, the trial court "must compare
its own independent judgment on the appropriate amount with
the jury’s award to determine whether the jury’s award is so
excessive as to work an injustice." Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med.
Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548 (4th Cir. 2003). We review the
district court’s determinations for abuse of discretion. Id.
The district court reasoned that the jury’s compensatory
damages award of $175,000 on King’s battery claim was
excessive because it significantly exceeded the compensatory
award on her Title VII claim, which encompassed far more of
McMillan’s unlawful conduct. The court believed that the
compensatory damages award for battery "appear[ed] to
include a punitive element." J.A. 512. The court accordingly
remitted the compensatory damages to $50,000 — the same
amount awarded on the Title VII claim. We agree with the
court’s reasoning and conclude that it acted well within its
discretion by choosing to remit the compensatory damages for
battery. The resulting $50,000 award was not excessive. The
jury’s verdict that McMillan committed battery against King
was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the ultimate
damages award is reasonable given the harm that King
suffered, including her weight gain, TMJ, sleeplessness, and
nightmares.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by declining
to remit the punitive damages on the battery claim after remitting
the compensatory damages. As discussed above, the evidence
supported a punitive damages instruction under
Virginia law. That the district court found an apparent punitive
element in the compensatory award — and corrected for
that by remittitur — does not mean it was also obliged to
remit the punitive award. The purpose of compensatory damages
is to make the injured plaintiff whole for losses actually
suffered, whereas punitive damages serve to "punish the
defendant for malicious conduct or to display to others an
example of the consequences they may expect if they engage
in similar conduct." F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d
595, 599 (Va. 1973). In light of these objectives, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion by leaving the
jury’s punitive award for battery undisturbed. An award of
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory
damages, Little v. Cooke, 652 S.E.2d 129, 142 (Va.
2007), and the district court acted within its discretion by
independently determining that the $100,000 punitive award
was not disproportionate to the compensatory award, remitted
to $50,000.

E.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
McMillan’s and Johnson’s motions for a new trial under Rule
59. "In considering a motion for a new trial, a trial judge may
weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses,
and if he finds the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, is based on false evidence or will result in a miscarriage
of justice, he must set aside the verdict, even if supported
by substantial evidence, and grant a new trial."

Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g
Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). "The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new
trial is within the sound discretion of the district court and
will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion."

Id. As our previous discussion establishes, the jury’s
verdicts on liability and the ultimate damages assessments are
not against the clear weight of the evidence, nor do they in
any way perpetuate a miscarriage of justice. In particular, the
district court acted within its discretion by remitting the compensatory
damages on the battery claim rather than granting
a new trial.

* * *

See: http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/081667.P.pdf

Outcome: Affirmed by published opinion.The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: Digested by Jesse Antell